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Abstract 
This paper presents Minimal Information Structural Realism (MISR). MISR claims that 
information (signified by I) is an ontologically and epistemologically objective physical entity
1
 
(signified by R) and is perceived as, but not identical to, organization, form, or structure of 
nature (signified by S). There is a relatively significant body of literature claiming that the 
essential, if not fundamental, element of nature is information.  Authors differ on the precise 
description of information conceived this way. However, they do agree that it would be a 
forming element in nature, a factor responsible for patterns observed in reality, apprehended 
through order, organization or structures. To express the fundamental ontological role of 
information in nature, a new kind of structural realism, or rather information structural realism 
(ISR), is needed. This paper is proposing exactly this in the form of minimal information 
structural realism (MISR).   The basic claim of MISR is that information is a foundation of 
reality and it is perceived or apprehended through patterns or structures. This claim embodies 
basic intuitions regarding the role of information in nature. MISR is not associated with the 
structural realism SR of the ontic or epistemic kinds, and is only remotely related to the concept 
of information structural realism (ISR) defined by Floridi.  
Keywords: Information, Information ontology, Structure, Structural Realism, Information Structural 
Realism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 Epistemic objectivity means that the object of knowledge is independent of the mind. Ontological objectivity  
means that the object is/exists as observer independent.  See lecture at Google Academy by John Searle (2015) for  
this type of distinction. Of course, this division assumes the existence of the mind independent of reality. 
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Introduction 
This paper presents Minimal Information Structural Realism (MISR). MISR claims that 
information (signified by I) is an ontologically and epistemologically objective physical entity
2
 
(signified by R) and is perceived as, but not identical to, organization, form, or structure of 
nature
3
 (signified by S). The term minimal (M) is added to ISR, meaning that no other claims, 
epistemic, ontic, or others, are associated with MISR. MISR may be seen as a version of 
Structural Realism (SR). However, MISR goes beyond structures conceived in SR
4
 and 
postulates that behind them lies information. MISR is not a claim about pancomputationalism 
though, along the views of, for example, Fredkin (1991), Lloyd (2007), or Muller (2008). The 
paper is not a comparison of MISR with SR but rather an explication of MISR and SR is 
providing solely the context for the discussion. 
The paper is organized as follows. First, the basic claims of SR are reviewed. Second, the 
concept of information is discussed. Finally, the basic assumptions of MISR are explicated. 
Finally, the conclusion collects the claims formulated in the paper and suggests some areas for 
further work. 
 
Structural Realisms (SR) 
SR, as explicated in the works of Psillos (2004), Brading and Laundry (2006), Frigg and 
Votis (2010), Ladyman (2016), and many others
5
, claims that nature is structural (roughly 
speaking because structure is what seems to be invariant in scientific models of nature; it is what 
survives theory changes). The two main currents in SR are ontic and epistemic.  Ontic Structural 
Realism (OSR), as defined by Ladyman (1998) and French (1998), embodies the view that 
structure is the ultimate reality and ontologically basic. In the strong version of OSR structures 
are “all the way down” (Frigg and Vostis (2010). Epistemic Structural Realism (ESR), defined 
by Worrall (1989), claims that structures are all that we can and may know about nature. There 
can be more to nature than structures but ESR does not say what this “more” could be.  The 
differences between ESR and OSR go much deeper but they are omitted here as having no 
importance for this discussion. Another version of SR that is interesting from the perspective of 
MISR is Information Structural Realism (ISR). 
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 Epistemic objectivity means that the object of knowledge is independent of the mind. Ontological objectivity  
means that the object is/exists as observer independent.  See lecture at Google Academy by John Searle (2015) for  
this type of distinction. Of course, this division assumes the existence of the mind independent of reality. 
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 In some structuralist papers the term ‘form’ is used exchangeable with ‘structure’. For example Worrall writes “.. 
There was continuity or accumulation if the shift, but the continuity is of form or structure... “(Worrall, 1989, p. 
117).  Such examples may be found in other papers on structuralism. 
4
This concept of structure obviously assumes that it is a representational or abstract (or abstracted) structure,  not 
nature itself. 
5
 SR and related ideas extend well into last century and traces of it can be found in much earlier works (for 
example, see Ladyman (2016)). 
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ISR has been defined by Floridi (2004, 2010). It does not change basic SRS claims, rather 
it admits that nature is structural, but structures are informational objects or information 
structures. Information structures supervene upon data (or data structures).  Data structures, in 
order to be information structures, must have meaning, which in turn depends on the presence of 
the scient agent
6
. Elementary data structures form “infons” or “elementary information particles” 
(Floridi, 2010. At the core of ISR is the General Definition of Information (GDI) which 
describes the foundational assumptions behind data, infons, and information structures (a more 
detailed description of data and infons is given in the following sections). ISR, because of its 
epistemic claims, can be seen as a variant of ESR
7
. 
Information  
 Most of the definitions of information relate it to knowledge, belief, or a communication 
process (for example, see Burgin (2003), Capurro (2009), Floridi (2010) or Nafria (2010)).   This 
makes information epistemically and ontologically subjective; information exists if someone 
recognizes it as such, it exists specifically in and for the mind of the receiver or an originator, or 
it exists when communicated (such as created, sent, and received). Epistemologically and 
ontologically subjective information is  the one specified by  General Definition of Information 
(GDI)  elaborated by Floridi ( 2010) or information defined by Bar-Hiller and Carnap (1953), 
Brooks (1980),Loose (1998), Sveiby (1998), Dretske (1999), Casagrande (1999), Burgin (2003), 
and Lenski (2010), to list just a few examples. Shannon’s definition of information as being a 
measure of the probably density function (PDF) over some probability space (Shannon (1948), 
Shannon and Weaver (1964), Pierce (1968)) may have subjective or objective properties 
depending on how probability is defined (Gilles (2000)). If we accept Shannon’s information for 
what it is (a moment of (PDF)),we may think of it as some measure of patterns, which may be 
natural or implied. However, how Shannon’s information is related to other concepts of 
information is disputable (see, for example, the discussion of Shannon’s information by Shannon 
Weaver (1964), Pierce (1968), Cherry (1978), Casagrande (1999), Hidalgo (2015), Krzanowski 
(2016), and Schroeder (2017)). 
8This incongruence between Shannon’s information and other 
concepts of information creates significant interpretation problems in explaining the role and 
nature of information. 
 In recent decades, the perception of information as a rational or logical element of nature, 
or its founding or ontological principle, has become quite widespread in physics, cosmology, 
                                                          
6
 Dependence of informational structures on the mind gives to Floridi’s ISR a Berkeleyan touch, so it seems. 
7
The problem for SR is that the definition of structure and its ontological meaning are open; SR structure is often 
left unspecified (Vostis, 2010; Floridi, 2004), or assumed to be logical, physical, or mathematical in nature, or 
claimed that it is an information object of the sort defined in the OOP paradigm (Floridi, 2005), but there is no 
single version of a structure accepted in SR. 
8
 For example, Hidalgo writes “…the interpretation of entropy and information that emerged from Shannon’s work 
was hard to reconcile both with the traditional use of the word information and with the interpretation that 
emerged from Boltzmann’s work” (Hidalgo, 2105, p. 15). 
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computing sciences, biology, and other sciences. Information seems to be a unifying concept 
connecting these diverse domains. The success of computing models of natural phenomena can 
be explained by postulating that computing models and nature share a common element – 
information (see for example Polak (2017)). 
 One may argue that the concept of information as an ontological element of nature goes 
back as far as the pre-Socratic Greeks and Ancient China (Curd (2011), Oldstone-Moore (2011)). 
However, it is safer to focus on the twentieth century authors; the incomplete, selective, and 
rather idiosyncratic list would include
9
 Zuse (1970), von Weizsäcker (1970), Turek (1978), 
Wheeler (1982),Heller (1987, 2014), Collier (1989),  Batenson (1979), Stonier (1990), Toffoli 
(1990), Thagard (2000), Barwise and Ethemendy (2000),Steinhart (2000), (Jadacki and Brozek 
2005), Seife (2006), de Castro (2007), and Hidalgo (2015). These authors claim in some way or 
another that information is at the center of nature, as energy is, and is related somehow to 
structure of nature or its form. Collier (1989) writes, “Physical things have properties that give 
them a definite structure and causal capabilities. If information is an intrinsic property of 
physical objects, then it seems likely that it is contained in their physical structure” (p. 6). 
Hidalgo (2015) states, “Information…understood broadly as a physical order ”and further“… 
information is not restricted to messages. It is inherent in all physical objects” (p. 6). Seife 
(2006) claims that “…there is something about information that transcends the medium it is 
stored in. It is a physical entity, a property of objects akin to energy or work or mass” (p. 57).   
Stonier (1990) writes that “…information exists… information has physical reality and 
constitutes an intrinsic property of the universe” (p. 12). Dodig-Crnkovic (2012) states “The 
universe is, from the metaphysical point of view, nothing but processes in structural patterns all 
the way down”.  Understanding patterns as information, one may infer that information is a 
fundamental ontological category” (p. 228). 
 For Hidalgo, Seife, and others, information is as real as any physical phenomena can be; 
it is objective, it is structural, and it is a property of the universe. Clearly, these authors are 
telling us that those seeing information only in an epistemic optic are missing something. With 
this view in mind, we are ready to propose MISR. 
 
Why Minimal Information Structural Realism? 
 Presented here are two arguments for the fusion of the concepts of structuralism and 
ontological information –in a way, this composition is MISR. One argument is based on the 
conclusions from models of quantum mechanics (QM) and cosmology, while the other argument 
is referred to as incompleteness of epistemic definitions of information.  Additional arguments in 
favor of MISR can be formulated, but these two seem to carry the most weight
10
. The arguments 
propose that interpreting natural structures as informational is consistent with the findings of 
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 Dates of publication refer to the edition not to the original date of publication of the work. 
10
 Other arguments include the arguments from the philosophical tradition, scientific intuitions, and success of 
computing models in modeling diverse aspects of nature. 
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physical sciences and that epistemic interpretation of information and structures (as in ESR and 
ISR) is not sufficient for the description of properties of nature. 
 Isomorphism of mathematical models of nature. The research in physics and cosmology 
provides evidence that different mathematical structures of natural phenomena support the same 
experimental results (Heller, 2014, p. 85).  This would suggest that behind different 
mathematical models, or structures, there is an unchanging physical reality, and mathematical 
models are just reflections, or approximations, of this reality. Heller, a cosmologist and a 
philosopher, gives the example of how the evolution of quantum states is modeled by three 
different mathematical representations: those of Schrödinger, Heisenberg and Dirac. Heller 
(2014) writes: 
 
There is a proof that these (Schrödinger, Heisenberg, Dirac) mathematical models are 
unitary equivalent, meaning that they lead to the same empirical predictions. To say it 
differently, there is an isomorphism between these models with respect to all observables. 
Thus, it is not the case that one mathematical structure corresponds to something we 
would call the structure of the world. (p. 64) 
 
Heller observes that, as these three models support the same experimental results, they must then 
refer to another invariant structure, to which we do not have access, but that is representing a true 
reality or is a reality in itself. Heller (2014) also writes, “This is not an exceptional situation in 
physics” (p. 65), meaning that multiple mathematical structures describing successfully the same 
physical phenomena exist, as well, in other areas of physics than just QM. Further, Heller (2009) 
writes that “…every (natural) structure has certain information; more constraints (by laws of 
physics) given structure imposes more information it contains. As the world is a structure, it 
contains certain information, or (we may say) the structure of the world encodes certain 
information” (p. 63).  Still, in a different work, Heller (1995) observes that “…the modern 
physics suggests that the world does not have a structure but is a structure. This structure 
contains in itself certain information (or is information).Science decodes its fragments by fitting 
mathematical structures to the structure(s) of the universe”(p. 170). Heller (1987, 1963) as states: 
 
…even if a real world contain something more than a form, with the methods of modern 
physics we are unable to touch it: this something intangible escapes through gaps of the 
mathematical models and experiments…. If information may be conceptualized as 
constraining options, every law of physics is information, as it constrains nature. It may 
be suggested that the stuff of the world is information. However, following Shannon’s 
definition of information, information is a structure and not what possibly can this 
structure fill in. In this view the structure of the world is an information encoded. The 
role of science is to break this code and reveal information. (p. XX) 
 
Heller’s proposition, therefore, is summarized as: 
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a) The universe (the world) is a structure.  
b) The mathematical models (mathematical structures) of the universe represent this 
structure up to isomorphism
11
 up to all observables. Mathematical structures approximate 
the world structure. 
c) The structure of nature is behind the structures we conceive and this structure behind 
structures has the characteristics of, and may be represented as, information, or is 
information
12
. 
d) Such information  is a physical phenomenon. It does not require a conscious observer or 
an originator to exist. It is ontologically objective. 
e) The world can be conceptualized as a structure containing information. This information 
is ontologically objective. 
 
Epistemic incompleteness. In epistemic definitions, information always supervenes on 
datum or data. The existence of data in addition to information is what may be called epistemic 
incompleteness. Epistemic incompleteness means that epistemic definitions of information 
recognize the necessary existence of something beyond epistemic information itself for the 
complete description of nature
13
. An exemplary case for epistemic incompleteness is offered by 
the GDI. In GDI, data are primary “stuff” of the universe and occur prior to information (Floridi, 
2010, p.84). Data are denoted as “lack of uniformity”, diaphora de re, didomena, or “a fracture in 
a fabric of being” (Floridi, 2010).Information forms structures composed of data in a certain, 
specific way that is meaningful to some observer. As Floridi (2010) writes, “…General 
Definition of Information (information is defined) in terms of data + meaning” (p. 83). Thus, 
information supervenes on data structures. In addition, between information structures and data, 
Floridi includes infon – an elementary particle of information; as  Floridi (2010) writes, “the 
parallel with fundamental particles of physics the electrons, protons, neutron, photons, and so 
forth” (p. 85). Infon is a strange concept, as on one hand it is conceived to be similar to 
elementary, physical particles and objective ontologically, while, on the other hand, it has an 
epistemic, subjective quality.  
The incompleteness arguments can be summarized in the following way: 
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 Heller interprets isomorphism following Weyl (1949, p. 25). The critical point Heller is making that the 
mathematical structures are not isomorphic to each other but only  ‘up to the empirical results”. This means that 
they are different yet consistent with natural phenomena. This may only mean that they are not representing the 
phenomena simpliciter but its facet, or aspect. 
12
 The essence of this argument is not that there are isomorphic structures but that there are isomorphic 
structures experimentally equivalent. 
13
 It is interesting that data are usually considered to be ontologically objective entities. Thus, epistemic definitions 
of information (depending on data for their definition) indirectly admit the existence of ontologically objective 
component. 
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a) Epistemic information supervenes on data or/and infons. 
b) Epistemic information for the description of nature requires an ontological component 
(data). 
c) Ontological information (by definition) does not require any other concept for its 
definition. Ontological information has a more parsimonious definition of information 
than epistemic one. 
d) Ontological information does not supervene on any other phenomena. 
e) Ontological information is a more fundamental concept than epistemic information. 
f) Ontological Information is better suited for description of natural phenomena.   
  
Minimal Information Structural Realism 
MISR combines intuitions about the structural nature of reality and the ontological and 
foundational role played by information.  Structures in MISR are the invariant (natural) order 
behind the abstract structures of ESR or OSR. Information in MISR is not something awaiting to 
be recognized by a scientific mind, but rather an organizational principle pervading nature. This 
view of structures and information is not present in current strands of SR (ESR, OSR, and ISR).  
MISR claims that information is an objective aspect of reality and it is perceived or 
apprehended through patterns or structures. No data and no infons are necessary to define what 
information is.  
MISR is not associated with ESR and OSR directly, but it does not contradict them. 
MISR is somewhat related to the concept of Floridi’s ISR, in that both ISR and MISR attribute 
importance to the role of information in nature, yet do so in different ways. Floridi’s ISR claims 
that structures perceived in SR strands are informational structures, or can be interpreted as 
informational, similar to informational structures modeled by the Object Oriented Programming 
(OOP) paradigm (Floridi, 2004). MISR claims that structures in SR reflect, or approximate, the 
structure of nature that contains information.  
Versions of MISR may support more nuanced versions of MISR along ontic, epistemic, 
mathematical, quantum, or computational perspectives. Of course, each of these versions of ISR 
must be refined and evaluated for its logical coherence and correspondence with the facts of 
physics
14
.  In MISR, the relationship of structures to information is like the relationship of 
energy to work: energy is characterized by the ability to do work, and so information is the 
ability to form structures
15
. Such a definition of energy does not make it meta-physical, and such 
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 One would have to mention the differences in the understanding of realism in SR and MISR.  In SR, realism 
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denotes the objective nature of information. Both realisms, in further interpretations, do, however, converge on 
the same claim that there is an objective reality that we can study. Realism is a polysemic concept that splits 
various versions of scientific realism (see for example Chakravartty (2007)). It seems that MISR may add still 
another interpretations to what is real. 
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 Fundamental concepts in physics are often described by the way they manifest themselves. For example, the 
concept of energy is defined as a capacity to perform work or a capacity to cause movement. The concept of 
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a definition of information does not make it other-worldly, but rather makes it as physical as can 
be. 
Conclusions and Open Issues 
SR and MISR take two different, but not completely contradictory, views of nature and 
our knowledge of it.  SR claims structures are what is or what can be known
16
, but that they have 
nothing to do with information. In Floridi’s ISR, information is epistemic and it emerges over 
structures composed of data. MISR sees structures that we conceive as representations, or 
approximations, of the structure of nature, which is what is invariant behind SR structures. This 
structure of nature may be thought of as information or composed of information. 
One may ask, again, what is ontologically objective information? The best answer would 
be the one already given by an analogy to energy – information is a capacity to create order, 
form, or structure. While not a very clear explanation, fundamental concepts notoriously elude 
precise description just because they are, by definition, fundamental. Descriptions of 
fundamental concepts in SR (structures) or in ISR (data and infons) do not fare any better in 
clarity, yet they are missing what MISR offers: the power to explain isomorphism of 
mathematical models of physical phenomena and incompleteness of epistemic information.  
One interesting line of further study would be to investigate information in the context of 
unobservable detectable and undetectable - the division of physical phenomena and entities 
splitting versions of scientific realism  as pointed out  by Chakravartty (2007).  Further, 
assuming that information could be posited as unobservable detectable, it would be interesting to 
ask how this claim could be justified for information, if it could be justified at all.  
But what if information is an unobservable undetectable? 
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